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Abstract—A new cybersecurity attack (cryptojacking) is
emerging, in both the literature and in the wild, where an
adversary illicitly runs Crypto-clients software over the devices
of unaware users. This attack has been proved to be very
effective given the simplicity of running a Crypto-client into a
target device, e.g., by means of web-based Java scripting. In
this scenario, we propose Crypto-Aegis, a solution to detect and
identify Crypto-clients network traffic—even when it is VPN-ed.
In detail, our contributions are the following: (i) We identify
and model a new type of attack, i.e., the sponge-attack, being a
generalization of cryptojacking; (ii) We provide a detailed analy-
sis of real network traffic generated by 3 major cryptocurrencies;
(iii) We investigate how VPN tunneling shapes the network traffic
generated by Crypto-clients by considering two major VPN
brands; (iv) We propose Crypto-Aegis, a Machine Learning (ML)
based framework that builds over the previous steps to detect
crypto-mining activities; and, finally, (v) We compare our results
against competing solutions in the literature. Evidence from of
our experimental campaign show the exceptional quality and
viability of our solution—Crypto-Aegis achieves an F1-score of
0.96 and an AUC of 0.99. Given the extent and novelty of the
addressed threat we believe that our approach and our results,
other than being interesting on their own, also pave the way for
further research in this area.
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain actually tries to solve the old problem of
distributed consensus by exploiting solutions matured from
decades of research [1]. The solution coming from Bitcoin’s
blockchain is particularly interesting: entities participating to
the “voting” process should prove to have solved a moderately
hard puzzle, the so called Proof-of-Work (PoW) [2]. Indeed,
for the vast majority of cryptocurrencies, in order to verify
a transaction and to have it added to the distributed ledger,
participants are requested to compute a PoW. Computationally
solving PoW is referred as mining. Over time, the complexity
of puzzle solving (typically based on hashing as per Bitcoin
and several others, such as Altcoin) has increased, leading to
a rush for deploying more and more powerful systems that
nowadays are able to compute more than 40 · 1018 hashes per
second (worldwide hash rate for Bitcoin at the time of writing
this paper [3]). ASIC architectures are today guaranteeing
the best trade-off between power consumption, terrific hash
rate, size, cost, and life-time. The recent adoption of ASIC
architectures brings in again the major issue of centraliza-
tion [4]. Indeed, the huge gap between CPU/GPU and ASIC
mining makes the latter the only viable way to participate to
the network as a miner. Eventually, this causes centralization
since only ASIC-based crypto-miners can participate to the
consensus process. In order to mitigate the above trend, other
digital currencies have been created that are actually exploiting
different PoW strategies, being therefore ASIC-resistant. For
instance, Monero and Bytecoin are just two examples of
cryptocurrencies specifically designed to be mined with CPU-
based architectures. Indeed, both the cryptocurrencies adopt
the CryptoNight PoW algorithm where the marginal benefit
derived from specialized architectures such as GPU, FPGA,
or ASIC does not introduce any significant gain for justifying
the adoption of such a hardware. Therefore, mining is usu-
ally performed via CPU-based architectures. The CryptoNight
algorithm works by filling a segment of cache with random
data corresponding to memory addresses, then subsequently
hashing the resulting block after reading and writing to those
addresses [5].
PoW is becoming a significant source of revenues for the
entities participating to the consensus process. This phenom-
ena will grow even more with the increasing number of users
joining the digital currency markets. However, while PoW
computational requirements are fueling methodologies and
techniques to achieve more and more computational power
with less energy consumption, new malicious practices in-
volves PoW-offloading to unaware users. Indeed, a very recent
cybersecurity attack involves the illicit use of resources from
an unaware users to carry out PoW, i.e., cryptojacking [6].
This attack mainly consists on the unauthorized mining of
cryptocurrencies allowing malicious parties to steal resources
in terms of CPU, GPU, and memory from a target machine
with the aim of effortlessly collecting crypto-wealth. This
behaviour is gaining momentum for two main reasons: the
ease of deployment of crypto-clients; and, the difficulty to
detect those crypto-clients. While being a general threat, cryp-
tojacking is becoming particularly critical in Corporate ICT
where the vast majority of laptops, desktops, and smartphones
are distributed among the employees under a limited (if any)
supervision. Indeed, several unauthorized mining activities
have already been discovered. Russian nuclear scientists have
been arrested for “Bitcoin mining plot” [7], the US government
banned a Professor for secretly mining with National Science
Foundation supercomputers [8], a former Federal Reserve em-
ployee was sentenced to 12 months probation and a $5,000 fine
after pleading guilty to installing unauthorized software that
connected to an online Bitcoin network in order to earn units
of the digital currency [9], a Harvard student used 14,000-
Core supercomputer to mine Dogecoin [10], the factory lines
ar
X
iv
:1
91
0.
09
27
2v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
1 O
ct 
20
19
of Hoya, the leading manufacturer of optical products in Japan,
were shut down for three days as hackers tried to establish an
unauthorized cryptocurrency mining [11], just to cite a few.
Contribution. The major contributions of this paper are
twofold:
• A new type of attack: we define a novel type of attack
that subsumes the cryptojacking attack, i.e., the sponge-
attack, where an adversary (either internal or external)
secures a personal profit illicitly exploiting third party
computing resources.
• The Crypto-Aegis Framework: a ML based framework
to detect and identify clients suffering from a sponge-
attack. Crypto-Aegis enjoys the following features: (i)
Infrastructure independence. The analysis is performed
at the exit points (edge) of the Corporate network, inde-
pendently of network size, network layout, and even when
multiple layers of encryption are set in place, e.g., a VPN
is in use; (ii) Device Independence. We do not require any
modification to the already existing devices adopted by
the Corporate employees; (iii) Multi-adversarial profiles
support. Our solution detects the presence of illicit be-
haviours via network traffic analysis and independently of
the adversarial profiles, i.e., be it an insider or an outsider;
(iv) No clean state required. Our solution detects the
presence of a miner independently of the time the miner
started its activities; and, (v) Effectiveness. Our solution
achieves an F1-score of 0.96 and the AUC of the ROC
is greater than 0.99.
Roadmap. The paper is organized as follows. Section II
resumes the most important contributions in the area. Sec-
tion III introduces the scenario and the adversary model.
The details related to the measurement setup are depicted
in Section IV, while a throughout analysis of the collected
network traffic traces is presented in Section V. Section VI
depicts a baseline example analysis, i.e., Bitcoin vs standard
software, introducing all the statistics that will be considered
for the subsequent analysis. Sections VII and VIII introduce
the metodologies used by our Crypto-Aegis framework, related
to the detection and identification of full nodes and miners,
respectively. Finally, Section IX tackles with the general prob-
lem of detecting a Crypto-node in a Corporate network, while
a detailed discussion of our results and a comparison with
other solutions from the literature is presented in Section X.
Section XI draws some concluding remarks.
II. RELATED WORK
The computational power required to validate and to add
blocks to the Bitcoin blockchain has greatly limited the odds
that individuals without specialized hardware can provide any
contribution to this process. Dedicated small devices (e.g.,
smartphones, laptops, desktop), or more powerful ones (e.g.,
workstations, servers), to the mining process would not be
worth the cost of the electricity. This discourages users and
leaves only a few in the world the opportunity to make
contributions and earn the rewards arising. With the advent of
other CPU-based cryptocurrencies this scenario has undergone
many changes. History repeats itself again. In other ages,
by seeing a mine populated by mechanical diggers, the gold
digger with the only pick-axe on his shoulders would be forced
to find new promising shores. This return to the gold rush led
to the rediscovery of numerous attacks that had lost meaning
with Bitcoin. This type of attacks are identified by the term
cryptojacking. Hackers, as well as dishonest employees who
would like to round off their earnings, “borrow” resources
belonging to others to run the mining process. Hand in hand
with threats, some solutions have been already proposed, with
the aim of implementing countermeasures to mitigate their
effects.
A. Cryptojacking and Network Traffic Classification
Cryptojacking (also known as Drive-by Mining). The
computational power required to validate and to add blocks
to the Bitcoin blockchain has greatly limited the odds that
individuals without specialized hardware can provide any
contribution to this process. Dedicating small devices (e.g.,
smartphones, laptops, desktop), or more powerful ones (e.g.,
workstations, servers), to the mining process would not be
worth the cost of the electricity. This discourages users and
leaves only a few in the world the opportunity to make
contributions and earn the rewards arising. With the advent of
other CPU-based cryptocurrencies this scenario has undergone
many changes. History repeats itself again. In other ages,
by seeing a mine populated by mechanical diggers, the gold
digger with the only pick-axe on his shoulders would be forced
to find new promising shores. This return to the “gold rush” led
to the rediscovery of numerous attacks that had lost meaning
with Bitcoin. This type of attacks are identified by the term
cryptojacking. Hackers, as well as dishonest employees who
would like to round off their earnings, “borrow” resources
belonging to others to run the mining process. Hand in hand
with threats, some solutions have been already proposed, with
the aim of implementing countermeasures to mitigate their
effects.
In [12], the state-of-the art of crypto-mining attacks have
been investigated. By analyzing the malware code, as well as
its behavior upon execution, authors examine two common
attacks: web browser-based crypto-mining, and installable
binary crypto-mining, respectively. Browser-based crypto-
mining attacks exploit the JavaScript technology of web-
pages, taking advantage of two web technology’s advance-
ments: asm.js and WebAssembly [13], while installable
binary crypto-mining is possible by using modified versions
of the XMrig software [14]. The paper analyzes the techniques
adopted by cybercriminals to establish a persistence mecha-
nism and avoid detection, and it introduces both static and
dynamic analysis, useful to uncover the techniques employed
by the malware to exploit potential victims. In [15] the authors
present an in-depth study over cryptojacking. After identifying
a set of inherent characteristics of cryptojacking scripts, such
as the repeated hash-based computations and the regular call
stack, a behavior-based detector called CMTracker has been in-
troduced. The analysis of 853,936 popular web pages led to the
identification of 2770 unique cryptojacking samples, of which
868 belonging to Alexa’s top 100k ranking websites. A similar
solution has been proposed by [16]. The authors propose an
approach aiming to identify mining scripts, conducting a large-
scale study on the prevalence of cryptojacking in the Alexa’s
1 million websites. According to the analysis, on average 1
out of 500 websites hosts a mining script. Numerous works
have followed the same direction. In [6], authors conduct
measurements to establish the cryptojacking relevance and
profitability, wondering whether it should be classified as
an attack or as a business opportunity. In [17], 138 million
domains have been explored, of which 137 million among
com/net/org domains and 1 million coming from the Alexa’s
Top 1 million list. The analysis shows that the prevalence
of browser mining is currently the 0.08% of the analyzed
set, a worrying number that should not be underestimated.
The Alexa’s Top 1 million websites have been taken into
account even by [13], in which the authors studied the websites
affected by drive-by mining to understand the techniques being
used to evade the detection. As a result, 20 active crypto-
mining campaigns have been identified.
A first step towards the application of Machine Learning
techniques has been made by [18]. The authors present an
experimental study in which the dynamic opcode analysis suc-
cessfully allows the browser-based crypto-mining detection.
The proposed model can distinguish among crypto-mining
sites, weaponized benign sites (e.g., benign sites to which the
crypto-mining code has been injected), de-weaponized crypto-
mining sites (e.g., crypto-mining sites to which the start()
call has been removed), and real world benign sites. Although
the paper proposes an innovative approach to detect crypto-
mining activity, network traces are not analyzed and only
web-based crypto-mining is taken into account. In [19], the
authors introduce a method to detect the browser’s malicious
mining behavior. Heap snapshot and stack features have been
asynchronously extracted and automatically classified using
Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs). With 1159 malicious
samples analyzed, the experimental results show that the
proposed prototype recognizes the original mining samples
with 98% of accuracy if not encrypted, 93% otherwise.
III. SCENARIO, ASSUMPTIONS, AND ADVERSARY MODEL
In the following, we describe our reference scenario, the
assumptions we make as for the network infrastructure and
network traffic classification and, finally, the adversary model.
A. Scenario
Figure 1 shows the details of our reference scenario. We
consider a corporate network constituted by several intercon-
nected devices, including one that is controlled by a mali-
cious entity, willing to mine cryptocurrencies without being
detected. Our solution should be deployed at the network edge
and it involves only an Ethernet connection from the main
Corporate Network switch to a server running our Machine
Learning algorithm. We observe that our solution requires
interventions neither on the employee devices, nor on the
already existing network infrastructure. Moreover, our solution
can be easily deployed even when there are multiple exit con-
nections between the Corporate Network and the Internet: this
can be easily achieved by deploying multiple Ethernet links
to collect the data from the Corporate Network exit points.
We observe that the above configuration is very conservative
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Fig. 1. Network scenario: A Corporate device mines cryptocurrencies
controlled by a malicious entity. Crypto-Aegis is constituted by a Machine
Learning algorithm classifying the traffic coming from an Ethernet switch at
the edge of the Corporate Network.
with respect to standard commercial solutions. Indeed, in the
vast majority of cases, corporate solutions involve hardware
for deep packet inspection deployed before the exit point, or
even at multiple locations of the network. On the one hand
the association between traffic and device is much easier,
while on the other hand it requires a significant cost in terms
of hardware equipment and deployment. In our solution, we
consider the traffic already aggregated, i.e., affected by IP
masquerading/NAT, or even tunneled and re-encrypted by a
Virtual Private Network (VPN).
B. Adversary model
We consider two adversary models with respect to the
corporate network: (i) insider; and, (ii) outsider. We assume
the insider has direct access to the hardware resources of the
company, and therefore, has the opportunity to install new
software into it. A typical example is the employee willing to
accumulate crypto-wealth by exploiting corporate resources
such as CPU, GPU, and network bandwidth. Moreover, we
envisage an external adversary (outsider) being able to inject
one or more corporate devices with a malicious software
for performing unauthorized crypto-mining. Typical examples
might be both the increasing number of malware delivering
crypto-mining software to unaware users, and websites run-
ning crypto-mining Java scripts without the user’s consent. Our
adversary model (as depicted in Fig. 1) takes into account a
corporate device illicitly running crypto-mining-related activi-
ties. As previously stated, we stress that our model takes into
account a malicious device that might be controlled by either
a dishonest employee or by a remote hacker who took over
control of the device itself.
There are several strategies to mine without the company
consent, an activity that today is really difficult to detect and
prevent. This malicious behaviour might be implemented by
either a full node or a miner.
• Full node. It is a full-featured client of the cryptocurrency
infrastructure. It locally stores the whole blockchain and
participates to the consensus algorithm, being able to val-
idate all the transactions. The mining activity performed
by a full node is called solo mining because the process
is done independently from other nodes.
• Miner. It is a lightweight software that implements a
simple worker that receives jobs (i.e., hash computations
useful for the PoW) from a third party (i.e., a mining
pool). When the mining pool successfully mines a block,
both the reward and the fees will be divided among
all the participants, proportionally to the computational
power offered. This software does not participate in the
cryptocurrency protocol and does not require to store a
blockchain to work.
In our scenario, we assume the client (being either a
full node or a miner) is already provided with the ledger,
if needed, and does not require any warm-up operations.
Indeed, Crypto-Aegis does not resort to application-specific
transients and it does not require to be deployed before the
malicious device starts its illicit activity.
Definition. We define sponge-attack as the malicious
behavior of exploiting third-party hardware and software
resources to obtain a personal profit without the consent of
the infrastructure’s owner. The sponge-attack illicitly absorbs
resources from the corporate infrastructure and makes money
out of them in favor of the attacker.
This definition is more general than the one of Cryptojacking,
that only refers to mining activities. The sponge-attack,
instead, includes also any other activities performed with
someone else’s resources without authorization. An example
of sponge-attack could be a malicious full node installed
on a corporate server to perform a DDoS attack against a
cryptocurrency network by using the company’s network
resources.
The sponge-attack can be implemented by deploying either
a Full Node or a Miner.
Miner. The use of a mining pool software allows to carry
out mining activities without installing the heavier full node
software. An adversary can use this software to perform a
faster and stealthier attack since the targeted device does not
need to store the ledger, usually very large. Furthermore,
by joining a mining pool, profits are increased even if the
available resources are limited.
Full node. Deploying a full node into a network without
the administrator consent has significant advantages for the
adversary. Firstly, the full node gives to the adversary the
capability to perform solo mining, if the victim’s resources are
sufficiently powerful. Moreover, the full node could be used
to attack the cryptocurrency’s network, by performing double
spending attacks, DDoS attacks, Sybil attacks, Eclipse attacks
and possibly others.
C. Terminology
In the following we refer to different actors and actions by
using the fallowing terminology:
• Crypto-client: A software illicitly installed in a device
belonging to the Corporate Network with the aim of
performing the sponge-attack.
• Standard software: A software legitimately installed in a
device of the Corporate Network.
• Reference device: A laptop used for running both the
Standard software and the Crypto-clients used in this
paper.
IV. MEASUREMENT SETUP AND PRELIMINARY
CONSIDERATIONS
In this section we provide a description of our measurement
setup and a preliminary statistical analysis of the collected
traces.
Measurement setup. Our measurement setup can be
resumed by Fig. 2. We consider two scenarios: Scenario
1 where a VPN tunnel adds an encryption layer to the
communication, and Scenario 2 where the client is directly
connected to the Internet. In Scenario 1, the malicious device
is connected to the Internet through an encrypted VPN tunnel.
For our measurements, we used two different well-known
VPN brands, i.e., Nord VPN (v. 1.2.0) and Express VPN
(v. 1.5.0). At the time of writing this paper, Express VPN
features more than 2000 servers in 148 countries while Nord
VPN features 5064 servers in 62 countries. We arbitrarily
set the VPN exit node to France for all our measurements.
Conversely, in Scenario 2, the malicious device is directly
connected to the Internet without resorting to any additional
encryption layer. The malicious device—acting as our
reference device when not mining—is a Dell XPS15 laptop
running Ubuntu 18.04 (64 bit). All the extracted features are
publicly available at [20].
Definition. We define ingoing flow all the network traffic
from the Internet to our reference device. Moreover, we
refer as outgoing flow the network traffic generated by the
reference device and sent to the Internet.
We collected network traffic from three different
cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Bytecoin and Monero) and
three different applications (Skype, YouTube, and standard
office applications mixed together) as it follows:
• Skype. We run an audio Skype-call and collected all the
network traffic from/to the reference device.
• YouTube. We collected the network traffic generated by a
random YouTube video from/to the reference device.
• Office network traffic. We logged the network traffic gen-
erated by the reference device while using it for standard
office tasks, e.g., e-mail, web-browsing, download and
upload of files, Microsoft Office365, etc.
The above applications have been selected as a reference
excerpt of three traffic patterns coming from three different
TABLE I
CRYPTOCURRENCIES AND CLIENTS
Cryptocurrency Type Client Version
Bitcoin Full Node Bitcoin Core 0.17.0
Bitcoin Miner bfgminer 5.5.0
Monero Full Node Lithium Luna 0.12.3.0-release
Bytecoin Full Node Bytecoin Wallet 3.3.2
Bytecoin/Monero Miner XMrig 2.8.1
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Fig. 2. Measurement setup: We consider 2 different scenarios. The malicious
device is connected to the network through a VPN Tunnel (Scenario 1) and
the malicious device is directly connected to the Internet (Scenario 2). We
adopted one laptop for the mining activities (malicious device), one other
laptop for collecting all the in-transit packets and finally, a switch featuring
a monitoring port.
application scenarios that are audio calls, video streaming,
and standard office network traffic. We observe how such
network traffic categories cover more than 87% of the 2018
global consumer internet traffic [21]. Since our idea is to infer
on the presence of a Crypto-client from the network traffic,
we considered the network traffic from the above standard
applications as the background “noise” hiding the traffic of the
Crypto-client. Our goal is to discriminate the flows involving
the Crypto-client from the other flows in the network.
It is known that Machine Learning for network traffic
classification is biased by several parameters, i.e., features,
type of traffic, trace length, network state, etc. One major
concern is related to the consistency of the extracted features
given the limited trace length. In particular, we paid particular
attention to capture packets from clients at steady-state and
after the initial sync period was accomplished. Indeed, Crypto-
clients require a warm-up period to download the blockchain
and validate it. This guarantees that our log excerpts represent
a consistent snapshot of a steady-state client either syncing or
mining for the blockchain network.
V. NETWORK TRAFFIC ANALYSIS AND PATTERNS
In this section, we start the analysis of the collected network
traffic by considering the two network flows: ingoing and
outgoing, as explained in the previous section. In order to
guarantee a fair comparison between the various scenarios,
we extracted the same number of consecutive samples for each
network trace, i.e., 4576 samples. Table II shows the network
traces we have collected considering the different application
scenarios, i.e., Office, Skype, YouTube, Bytecoin, Monero,
and Bitcoin. For each scenario, we report the trace duration
equivalent to the extracted samples, the quantile 0.5 computed
on the interarrival times, and finally the quantile 0.5 computed
on the packet sizes. In order to ease the discussion, we refer
to each trace by using a sequence of keywords as follows:
[Application][Flow direction][VPN Type], where Application
can be Office, Skype, YouTube, Bytecoin, Monero, or Bitcoin,
Flow direction might be either Ingoing or Outgoing, while
VPN Type might be empty (no VPN), Express, or Nord.
Firstly, we observe how considering the same amount of
samples involves very different collection time depending on
the application scenario, i.e., about 38.37 seconds for YouTube
Ingoing with Express VPN, while about 4598 seconds for
Bytecoin Ingoing. In the following we provide some insight
from Table II:
• Bytecoin. Interarrival times are significantly affected by
the use of VPN, i.e., time reduction spans from 5 to 10
times. Packet sizes are affected as well, i.e., the increase
spans from 2 times to 3 times. It is worth noting that the
reduction of the interarrival time with the increasing of
the packet sizes involves a reduction of the trace length
to guarantee the delivery of the same amount of data.
• Monero. VPN tunnelling affects interarrival times of
Monero depending on the flow. While ingoing flows expe-
rience a reduction of the interarrival time, outgoing flows
slightly increase their values. Packet size is affected by
the same phenomena. While packet size of ingoing flow
ramps up from 66 Bytes (No VPN) to 1433 Bytes (Nord),
outgoing flows work in the opposite way decreasing from
1242 Bytes (No VPN) to 131 Bytes (Nord).
• Bitcoin. Interarrival times are more homogeneous for
Bitcoin. Indeed, values span between 180 µs and 300
µs. Nevertheless, we observe that VPN tunnelling affects
packet size, indeed for both Nord VPN and Express VPN,
packet size is becoming significantly larger.
Discussion. VPN tunnelling tends to squeeze the packets
all together and to increase the packet size. Bitcoin is special:
VPN tunnelling is affecting much less the original traffic
pattern although there are some significant variations for the
packet size. It is worth noting the differences among the
cryptocurrencies when the traffic is collected without VPN
tunnelling. Interarrival times and packet sizes are very different
from each other among the currencies as well as between the
ingoing/outgoing flows.
Given the above considerations, we consider more in-
depth analysis of the flows in order to subsequently identify
the features to be used for the Machine Learning process.
Figures 3 and 4 show quantile 0.05, 0.5, 0.95, minimum and
maximum values associated to each collected trace during
our measurements. Outgoing flows present packet sizes very
different from each other in the range between 100 and 1000
bytes. Only few exceptions fall out of that range, while it is
worth noting how quantile 0.5, e.g., the median, changes for
each network trace. Moreover we observe that, raw traffic from
Bytecoin, Monero, and Bitcoin present almost the same values
TABLE II
COLLECTED TRACES: DURATION, MEDIAN OF INTERARRIVAL TIMES,
AND MEDIAN OF PACKET SIZES.
Trace Traceduration
Int. Time
Median
Pkt.
Size
Median
[seconds] [seconds] [bytes]
Office Ingoing 50.998 0.000118 1434
Office Outgoing 59.502 0.000311 60
Office Ingoing Express 84.460 0.001003 874
Office Outgoing Express 147.281 0.013116 478
Office Ingoing Nord 104.700 0.000265 119
Office Outgoing Nord 105.479 0.000162 1433
Skype Ingoing 146.1 0.018730 136
Skype Outgoing 145.5 0.019988 130
Skype Ingoing Express 92.577 0.020065 518
Skype Outoing Express 91.911 0.019944 535
Skype Ingoing Nord 87.117 0.020119 169
Skype Outgoing Nord 87.338 0.020734 196
YouTube Ingoing 140.35 0.000001 1434
YouTube Outgoing 896.04 0.001074 54
YouTube Ingoing Express 38.378 0.001848 927.5
YouTube Outgoing Express 816 0.022749 483
YouTube Ingoing Nord 168.48 0.004814 1432
YouTube Outgoing Nord 271.93 0.007282 119
Bytecoin Ingoing 4597.2 0.004673 593
Bytecoin Outgoing 3280.4 0.001130 66
Bytecoin Ingoing Express 729.67 0.000443 706
Bytecoin Outgoing Express 979.43 0.000858 134
Bytecoin Ingoing Nord 1579 0.000803 1432
Bytecoin Outgoing Nord 2011.1 0.000752 119
Monero Ingoing 822.55 0.000450 66
Monero Outgoing 790.58 0.000014 1242
Monero Ingoing Express 197.52 0.000044 890
Monero Outgoing Express 215.45 0.000090 820
Monero Ingoing Nord 445.29 0.000137 1433
Monero Outgoing Nord 404.01 0.000117 131
Bitcoin Ingoing 669.27 0.000600 90
Bitcoin Outgoing 659.45 0.000242 66
Bitcoin Ingoing Express 356.1 0.000383 146
Bitcoin Outgoing Express 389.88 0.000180 146
Bitcoin Ingoing Nord 692.44 0.000502 165
Bitcoin Outgoing Nord 822.29 0.000359 119
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Fig. 3. Packet size for outgoing flows: Candle-sticks represent the minimum,
quantile 0.05, quantile 0.95 and the maximum packet size for the outgoing
flows while the circles represent quantile 0.5.
of quantile 0.05 and 0.95. Interestingly, such values get closer
(being characterized by less variations) when their traffic is
tunnelled through a VPN.
Ingoing flows behave differently from outgoing ones. Packet
size spans between closer ranges, i.e., quantile 0.05 and 0.95
are closer with respect to the outgoing flows. Median values
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Fig. 4. Packet size for ingoing flows: Candle-sticks represent the minimum,
quantile 0.05, quantile 0.95 and the maximum packet size for the ingoing
flows while the circles represent quantile 0.5.
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Fig. 5. Interarrival times for ingoing flows: Candle-sticks represent the
minimum, quantile 0.05, quantile 0.95, and the maximum interarrival times
for the ingoing flows—circles representing quantile 0.5.
are randomly distributed and we do not observe any significant
pattern in the VPN tunneling of cryptocurrency clients.
We performed the same analysis for the interarrival times
obtained by differentiating the absolute arrival times logged
by WireShark. The ingoing flows (Fig. 5) of cryptocurrencies
are characterized by very similar values, i.e., almost the
same quantile 0.05 and 0.95, although we observe that the
median values span between 10−2 and 10−4 seconds. Similar
observations can be drawn by looking at the outgoing flows
as depicted by Fig. 6.
VI. TRAFFIC CLASSIFICATION: A BASELINE EXAMPLE
We implemented all the traffic-classification related tasks
in MatLab (R2018a) adopting the Statistics and Machine
Learning Toolbox©. Our Crypto-client detection algorithm
involves the following steps:
• Features extraction. Features identification and extraction
are paramount activities to maximize the performance of
the classifier. In this work, we consider several features
starting from the very standard ones, i.e., interarrival
time and packet size. We also consider other derived
features with the aim of validating how they affect the
final classifier performance.
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Fig. 6. Interarrival times for outgoing flows: Candle-sticks represent the
minimum, quantile 0.05, quantile 0.95 and the maximum interarrival times
for the outgoing flows while the circles represent quantile 0.5.
• k-Fold Cross Validation. Cross validation is a common
practice to average the results of Machine Learning
algorithms. It is usually performed by defining a random
partition of k out of n observations. The partition divides
the observations into k disjoint subsamples (or folds),
chosen randomly but with roughly equal size. The default
value of k is 10.
• Random Forest (RF). We adopted the TreeBagger MatLab
class to implement the RF algorithm. The TreeBagger
combines the results of many decision trees, which re-
duces the effects of overfitting and improves generaliza-
tion. TreeBagger grows the decision trees in the ensemble
using bootstrap samples of the data.
• Statistics. This task involves the generation of statistics
from the classifier results. Our statistics include (among
others) True Negative (TN), False Positive (FP), False
Negative (FN), and True Positive (TP), confusion matrix,
etc..
In this section, we introduce a simplified version of our
methodology considering a binary decision problem. Our goal
is to analyze the traffic of a network to determine whether
a malicious mining activity is happening. We recall that the
traffic collected from the Bitcoin client is related only to the
syncing process (being a Full Node), while the one related to
the mining process will be considered later on. Moreover, as
for the “noise” traffic, we adopted a laptop featuring Windows
10 PRO and performing standard office tasks as discussed
in the previous section. We now consider only two network
traces from Table II: Office Outgoing and Bitcoin Outgoing.
Moreover, we assume the hypothesis H0: the current network
event has been generated by the Bitcoin client. We run the 10-
Fold cross validation algorithm using the RF algorithm (with
a default value of 20 trees) and only two features: interarrival
time and packet size. Table III shows the confusion matrix
associated to the classifier results, i.e., 4314 times Bitcoin is
correctly recognized (True Positive - TP) while 4321 times the
class Office is correctly recognized (True Negative - TN). The
other values refer to False Positive - FP, i.e., 254 observations
are wrongly classified as Bitcoin, and False Negative - FN, i.e.,
TABLE III
BASELINE EXAMPLE: BITCOIN VS OFFICE SCENARIO.
Predicted
No
Predicted
Yes
Actual
No 4321 254
Actual
Yes 261 4314
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Fig. 7. Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve: True Positive Rate as
a function of the False Positive Rate. The Area Under the Curve (AUC) is
about 0.971 for both the application scenarios.
261 observations are classified as not-Bitcoin (Office) while
they actually are. Other interesting metrics—that will be used
in the remainder of the paper—are the True Positive Rate
(TPR) = 0.941, i.e., the number of True Positive normalized to
the number of actual Bitcoin observations (TP / (TP + FN)),
and the False Positive Rate (FPR) = 0.059, i.e., the number
of False Positive normalized to the number of predicted
observation for Bitcoin (FP / (FP+TN)).
FPR and TPR can be used to highlight the classifier per-
formance at different threshold values when the system can
accept different levels of false positive values. Figure 7 shows
the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve consisting
of True Positive Rate (TPR) as a function of False Positive
Rate (FPR). Another important metric directly connected to
the ROC curve is the so called Area Under the Curve (AUC),
i.e., the area under the ROC curve being a value spanning
between 0 (worst case) and 1 (best case). As for the ROC
curve in Fig. 7, AUC is about 0.971 for both the classes,
Bitcoin and Office, respectively.
We now add more features to the current scenario and
we analyze the performance of the classifier. Let us define
the already (basic) introduced features and the new ones, as
follows:
• Interarrival time (δ): the time elapsed between two con-
secutive packets.
• Packet Size (γ): Packet size associated to each packet.
• Moving mean of δ (µδ(w)): each mean value is calculated
over a sliding window of length w across neighboring
elements of δ.
• Moving standard deviation of δ (σδ(w)): each standard
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Fig. 8. Mean Square Error (MSE) of the classification results as a function
of the features and the moving window size (w).
deviation is calculated over a sliding window of length
w across neighboring elements of δ.
• Moving mean of γ (µγ(w)): each mean value is calcu-
lated over a sliding window of length w across neighbor-
ing elements of γ.
• Moving standard deviation of γ (σγ(w)): each standard
deviation is calculated over a sliding window of length
w across neighboring elements of γ.
In order to evaluate the impact of the features on the
classification algorithm we used the Mean Square Error (MSE)
averaged over all the trees in the ensemble and divided by
the standard deviation taken over the trees, for each feature.
The larger this value, the more important the feature is in
the classification process. Figure 8 shows the Mean Square
Error (MSE) as a function of the moving window size (w)
and the different type of features. Firstly we observe that, for
this scenario—Bitcoin Vs Office—the most important feature
is γ, i.e., the packet size, represented by the red bar. The other
features have about the same weights, while it turns out that
w = 5 is a good trade-off for the window size of the moving
mean and the standard deviation.
VII. CRYPTO-AEGIS: DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION
OF FULL NODES
In this section, we consider the traces of Table II while
parting them into ingoing and outgoing flows. As previously
discussed, we consider three main metrics: True Positive Rate
(TPR), False Positive Rate (FPR) and the Area Under the
Curve (AUC). Our RF classifier has been configured with 20
default trees, the 6 features already introduced in the previous
section, and a moving window of 5 observations. Moreover,
we consider only Full Node clients; therefore, the observed
network traffic will be related to syncing and consensus
operations.
By
tec
oin
By
tec
oin
 Ex
pre
ss
By
tec
oin
 No
rd
Mo
ne
ro
Mo
ne
ro 
Ex
pre
ss
Mo
ne
ro 
No
rd
Bit
co
in
Bit
co
in 
Ex
pre
ss
Bit
co
in 
No
rd
0.7
0.72
0.74
0.76
0.78
0.8
0.82
0.84
0.86
0.88
0.9
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
By
tec
oin
By
tec
oin
 Ex
pre
ss
By
tec
oin
 No
rd
Mo
ne
ro
Mo
ne
ro 
Ex
pre
ss
Mo
ne
ro 
No
rd
Bit
co
in
Bit
co
in 
Ex
pre
ss
Bit
co
in 
No
rd
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
Fa
ls
e 
Po
si
tiv
e 
R
at
e
Fig. 9. True Positive Rate and False Positive Rate for ingoing network traffic
of a Full Node considering different cryptocurrencies.
Ingoing flows. Figure 9 shows TPR and FPR for all the
cryptocurrencies we have considered in this work. Firstly, we
observe how the overall results are quite satisfactory, i.e., the
mean computed on the TPR and FPR values is about 0.86
and 0.0088, respectively. The best detection performance are
achieved over Bytecoin Express (TPR=0.92, FPR=0.0047) and
Bitcoin Express (TPR=0.92, FPR=0.008). Conversely, worst
case performance are achieved for:
• Bytecoin (TPR=0.81, FPR=0.012). Misclassifications are
mainly due to Monero (332 cases - 7%), Bitcoin (106
cases - 2%), and Bytecoin Nord (97 cases - 2%).
• Monero Express (TPR=0.80, FPR=0.014). False positive
are mainly due to Office Express (381 case - 8%),
YouTube Express (148 cases - 3%) and Bytecoin Express
(63 cases - 1%).
• Bitcoin Nord (TPR=0.84, FPR=0.009). Classification er-
rors mainly come from Monero Nord (251 cases - 5%),
Bitcoin Express (217 cases - 4%) and Bytecoin Nord (70
cases - 1%).
Our results prove that ingoing flows (from the Internet
to the device) can be used to effectively identify malicious
miners inside local networks. In particular, traffic generated
by cryptocurrencies clients (without VPN) can be detected
with high TPR values, i.e., 0.84, 0.87 and 0.90 for Bytecoin,
Monero, and Bitcoin. The adoption of a VPN tunnel does not
improve the privacy of the Crypto-client: TPR is increasing
for Bytecoin when tunneled through a VPN, while Monero
and Bitcoin have diverging performance as a function of
the adopted VPN brands. Moreover, we observe that worst
case performance are due to Crypto-clients misclassified for
other Crypto-clients; indeed, there is only one exception: 148
cases of YouTube Express classified as Monero Express. We
consider the previous phenomenon as a by-product of the VPN
tunnelling; indeed, it is reasonable to assume that the same
VPN is (slightly) re-shaping different traffic patterns in the
same way.
Outgoing flows. Figure 10 shows TPR and FPR for all
the cryptocurrencies we have considered in this work. As for
the ingoing flows, we observe how the overall results are,
again, quite satisfactory, i.e., the mean value computed on the
TPR and the FPR values is 0.85 and 0.008, respectively. The
best detection performance are achieved over Bitcoin Express
(TPR=0.93, FPR=0.006) and Bitcoin (TPR=0.90, FPR=0.005).
Conversely, worst case performance are achieved for:
• Monero Express (TPR=0.79, FPR=0.011). Misclassifica-
tions are mainly due to Office Express (563 cases - 12%)
and YouTube Express (295 cases - 6%).
• Bytecoin Nord (TPR=0.77, FPR=0.012). False positive
are mainly due to Monero Nord (281 cases - 6%) and
Bitcoin Nord (202 cases - 4%).
• Bytecoin (TPR=0.78, FPR=0.009). Classification errors
mainly come from Monero (345 cases - 7%) and Bitcoin
(147 cases - 3%).
The above considerations prove that outgoing flows (from
the device to the Internet) can be used to effectively identify
malicious miners inside local networks. Crypto-clients (with-
out VPN) can be detected with TPR of about 0.80 (0.78),
0.84 (0.87) and 0.88 (0.90), for Bytecoin Ingoing (Outgoing),
Monero Ingoing (Outgoing) and Bitcoin Ingoing (Outgoing),
respectively. As for the ingoing flow analysis, VPN does not
significantly increase the privacy of the device: TPR values
fluctuate depending on the adopted VPN brand, but they still
remain high—and even increase for some cases. One more
interesting aspect is that misclassifications happen among
cryptocurrencies adopting the same VPN, i.e., a Crypto-client
is misclassified as belonging to another cryptocurrency but still
using the same VPN; although this is a marginal effect (most
frequent case is less than 12%) we can reasonably suspect
that VPN tunnelling is shaping the traffic patterns; that is why
(at least partially) the Machine Learning algorithm experience
such type of misprediction.
Area Under the Curve (AUC). As previously introduced,
the Area Under the Curve (AUC) is the area under the ROC
curve. Its value spans between 0 and 1, and the largest it is,
the better the classifier’s performance are. Figure 11 shows the
AUC values for the different traces/scenarios in Table II. For
both the ingoing and outgoing flows, the worst performance
are experienced by Bytecoin Express, Bitcoin Express, and
Bytecoin. Of course, this does not imply that VPN tunnelling
is protecting the privacy of the clients as previously discussed.
Indeed, we do not observe any significant difference with
or without the presence of a VPN tunnel: for all the three
cryptocurrencies the AUC values in presence of a VPN tunnel
are still very high, i.e., larger than 0.955.
VIII. CRYPTO-AEGIS: DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION
OF MINERS
In the following, we consider cryptocurrency clients acting
as pure Miners as already introduced in Section III. Therefore,
we consider bfgminer for both Bitcoin and XMrig for Bytecoin
and Monero as illicitly installed clients in a device belonging
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Fig. 10. True Positive Rate and False Positive Rate for outgoing network
traffic of a Full Node considering different cryptocurrencies.
By
tec
oin
By
tec
oin
 Ex
pre
ss
By
tec
oin
 No
rd
Mo
ne
ro
Mo
ne
ro 
Ex
pre
ss
Mo
ne
ro 
No
rd
Bit
co
in
Bit
co
in 
Ex
pre
ss
Bit
co
in 
No
rd
0.95
0.955
0.96
0.965
0.97
0.975
0.98
0.985
0.99
0.995
1
AU
C
Ingoing
Outgoing
Fig. 11. Area Under the Curve (AUC) for both ingoing and outgoing flows
of a Full Node considering different cryptocurrencies.
to a Corporate Network. As for the full node’s case, we
consider two different VPN, i.e., Express VPN and Nord VPN,
and two flows, i.e., ingoing and outgoing.
In the vast majority of cases, the mining task is performed
by mining pools [22] [23]. In practice, Miners collaborate
in pools to lower the variance of their revenue by sharing
rewards with a group of other Miners. We consider the same
measurement setup of Fig. 2, but we used a Miner as the peer
for the blockchain network. As for the analysis of the Full
Nodes (Section VII), we part all the collected traces into two
subsets: ingoing and outgoing flows.
Table IV resumes the network traces we have collected
when considering a Miner as a client: for each trace, we report
the duration, the median of both the interarrival times, and
the packet sizes. Firstly, we reduce all the traces to the same
amount of packets to guarantee a fair classification process for
the RF algorithm: we choose 832 packets. We observe how the
number of packets from the Miners is less than the one of the
Full Nodes: this is mainly due to the fact that Miners generate
TABLE IV
COLLECTED TRACES FROM MINERS: DURATION, MEDIAN OF
INTERARRIVAL TIMES, AND MEDIAN OF PACKET SIZES.
Trace Traceduration
Int. Time
Median
Pkt.
Size
Median
[seconds] [seconds] [bytes]
Bytecoin Ingoing 3935.21 2.41 131
Bytecoin Outgoing 2558.00 0.39 66
Bytecoin Ingoing Express 2486.86 1.47 187
Bytecoin Outgoing Express 1961.86 0.27 122
Bytecoin Ingoing Nord 2513.18 0.37 184
Bytecoin Outgoing Nord 2142.08 0.29 119
Monero Ingoing 15377.52 13.97 131
Monero Outgoing 10483.16 6.11 66
Monero Ingoing Express 3658.87 2.46 173
Monero Outgoing Express 3688.58 2.53 122
Monero Ingoing Nord 6184.70 0.34 429
Monero Outgoing Nord 5218.86 0.17 119
Bitcoin Ingoing 8075.92 0.29 125
Bitcoin Outgoing 8014.65 0.37 66
Bitcoin Ingoing Express 2315.13 0.12 181
Bitcoin Outgoing Express 2797.90 0.37 122
Bitcoin Ingoing Nord 4756.34 0.13 178
Bitcoin Outgoing Nord 4644.65 0.19 119
much less traffic, as it turns out by comparing the interarrival
times from Table IV with the ones from Table II. Moreover,
it is worth noting the case of Monero: the interarrival times
are decreasing from 13.97 (Ingoing) and 6.11 (outgoing)
seconds to less than 3 seconds (Express), or 1 second (Nord)
when VPN tunneling is activated. Conversely, VPN does not
significantly affect packet size with one exception: Monero
Ingoing Nord experiences a packet size of 428 Bytes, while
the packet size of Monero Outgoing with no VPN is 66 Bytes.
As for the previous case, we consider True Positive Rate
(TPR) and False Positive Rate (FPR) as our reference metrics.
Ingoing flows. Figure 12 shows the TPR and the FPR for
different Miner clients when their ingoing flow is compared
with the ingoing flows of Office, Skype, and YouTube (same
traces from the Standard software of Table II). Firstly we
observe how raw traffic (not tunneled through a VPN) is better
identified: Bytecoin, Monero, and Bitcoin turn out to have
TPR values equal to 0.993, 0.983, and 0.985, respectively,
while FPR values are equal to 0.0018, 0.0004, and 0.0011,
respectively.
Worst case performance are due to Bytecoin Express, Mon-
ero Express and Bitcoin Express:
• Bytecoin Express (TPR = 0.79, FPR = 0.011). Misclas-
sifications are mainly due to Monero Express (36 cases
- 4%) and Bitcoin Express (10 cases - 1%).
• Monero Express (TPR = 0.77, FPR = 0.015). False
positive are mainly due to Bytecoin Express (56 cases
- 6%).
• Bitcoin Express (TPR = 0.77, FPR = 0.013). Classifica-
tion errors mainly come from Monero Express (102 cases
- 12%) and Bytecoin Express (68 cases - 8%).
Outgoing flows. Figure 13 shows TPR and FPR associated
to the outgoing flows for all the considered Miner clients
compared with Office, Skype, and YouTube network traces.
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Fig. 12. True Positive Rate and False Positive Rate for ingoing network traffic
of Miners of different cryptocurrencies.
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Fig. 13. True Positive Rate and False Positive Rate for outgoing network
traffic of Miners of different cryptocurrencies.
The mean values associated to TPR and FPR are 0.946
and 0.003. The best detection performance are achieved with
Bytecoin, Monero, and Bitcoin without VPN tunneling as in
the previous case (Ingoing flow analysis). As in this case
(ingoing flows), VPN tunneling affects the privacy of the
client decreasing the identification performance, and in the
following, we comment on the worst cases:
• Monero Express (TPR=0.86, FPR=0.009). Misclassifica-
tions are mainly due to Bitcoin Express (53 cases - 6%)
and Bytecoin Express (20 cases - 2%).
• Bitcoin Express (TPR=0.86, FPR=0.008). False positive
are mainly due to Monero Express (53 cases - 6%) and
Bytecoin Express (13 cases - 1%).
We highlight how—for both the Outgoing and Ingoing
cases— misclassification are only due to cryptocurrencies,
TABLE V
SPONGE-ATTACK DETECTION: INGOING TRAFFIC CLASSIFICATION.
Predicted
No
Predicted
Yes
Actual
No 288452 10255
Actual
Yes 7979 290728
TABLE VI
SPONGE-ATTACK DETECTION: OUTGOING TRAFFIC CLASSIFICATION.
Predicted
No
Predicted
Yes
Actual
No 275969 9370
Actual
Yes 9152 276187
i.e., the vast majority of the False Positive are due to other
cryptocurrencies and not to Standard software traffic. Finally,
it is interesting to observe how VPNs are more effective to
protect the privacy of the Miners respect to the Full Node
scenario. This is mainly due to the fact that the overall traffic
sent/received by each Miner is significantly less than that one
of Full Nodes and it is buried in the VPN-encrypted traffic.
IX. CRYPTO-AEGIS: SPONGE-ATTACK DETECTION
In this section, we consider the more general binary decision
problem of detecting the presence of a Crypto-client in the
scenario of Fig. 1. Therefore, we assume the hypothesis H0:
the current network event has been generated by a Crypto-
client. We consider the traces from the Standard software
previously introduced, i.e., Office, Skype, and YouTube, and
we test them against all the traces involving a Crypto-clients.
As a preliminary step, we pre-process all the traces and
uniform their lengths to obtain two classes: the first one
constituted by Office, Skype, and YouTube traces (evenly dis-
tributed); and, the second one constituted by all the traces from
the Crypto-clients (Bytecoin, Monero, and Bitcoin) with and
without the VPN tunnels. Table V ( VI) shows the confusion
matrix associated to the previously introduced binary classifier
assuming the ingoing (outgoing) network traffic. Firstly, we
observe that True Positive sums up to 290728, i.e., the number
of times Crypto-clients are correctly identified. Moreover, the
classifier correctly identifies 288452 events as network traffic
from Standard software. Nevertheless, there are 10255 and
7979 false positive and false negative events, respectively.
The results on the outgoing traffic are characterized by sim-
ilar outstanding performance, i.e., TP=276187, TN=275969,
FP=9370, and FN=9152.
Figure 14 shows the Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curve consisting of the True Positive Rate (TPR) as
a function of the False Positive Rate (FPR) assuming only
the ingoing flows. We also report: the Area Under the Curve
(AUC), being it equal to about 0.99428 for the ingoing traffic;
and, the F1-score — given by the harmonic average of the
precision (TP / (TP + FP)) and the recall (TP / (TP + FN)).
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Fig. 14. Sponge-attack detection for Ingoing flows: True Positive Rate as a
function of the False Positive Rate assuming the traffic as generated by two
classes: Crypto-clients (Miners and Full Nodes) Vs standard applications.
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Fig. 15. Sponge-attack detection for Outgoing flows: True Positive Rate as
a function of the False Positive Rate assuming the traffic being generated by
two classes: Crypto-clients (Miners and Full Nodes) Vs standard applications.
F1-score is a measure of the accuracy: it is equal to 1 when
there is perfect both precision and recall, while it approaches
0 when conditions worsen.
Figure 15 shows the Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curve consisting of the True Positive Rate (TPR) as
a function of the False Positive Rate (FPR), assuming only
the outgoing flows. As for the previous case, we report both
the AUC and the F1-score.
Time to detect the Crypto-client. Recalling Fig. 8, we
observe that the detection time strictly depends on the number
of packets requested by the feature generation algorithm; in
particular, the moving mean and the moving standard devia-
tion. Full Nodes are characterized by very short interarrival
times, i.e., worst case is equal to 0.022749 seconds (median
value for YouTube Outgoing Express), and therefore, waiting
for 5 subsequent packets (moving window size used through-
out this paper) involves a really short period of time, i.e., less
than 120 ms. Even the longest window size depicted in Fig. 8,
i.e., 12 packets, requires less than 300ms. Conversely, Miners
require more time for being identified due to their stretched
interarrival times. We observe that there are specific Crypto-
client configurations from Table IV that are characterized by
large interarrival times, i.e., Bytecoin Ingoing and Monero
Ingoing. For such cases, assuming a moving window size w
equal to 5 consecutive packets, 12.05 and 69.85 seconds are
required, respectively.
X. DISCUSSION AND COMPARISON WITH OTHER
SOLUTIONS
In this section, we discuss the results shown in this paper,
while also comparing our Crypto-Aegis framework against
competing solutions existing in the literature.
Full Node. Our solution turned out to be very effective
for the detection and identification of Full Nodes in local
networks. The RF algorithm is able to independently detect
and identify Full Nodes by leveraging either ingoing and
outgoing flows. TPR and FPR metrics have similar values
although we observe a few exceptions related to the worst
cases: Bytecoin Ingoing and Monero Express Ingoing (TPR
> 0.8), and Bytecoin Outgoing and Bytecoin Nord Outgoing
(TPR > 0.79). Conversely, FPR are always less than 0.015,
guaranteeing an extremely low number of potential false
alarms.
Miner. Miners’ detection performance are similar to the
previous case, although we observe that TPR values for the
outgoing flows are (in general) greater than the ones for the
ingoing flows. This is mainly due to worse anonymization
performance achieved by Express VPN for all the ingoing
flows. More in general, we highlight the outstanding per-
formance of the classifier when the crypto-clients’ network
traffic is not tunneled through a VPN. Finally, we stress that,
for both the above scenarios (Full Nodes and Miners), false
positives are mainly due to cryptocurrencies predicted as other
cryptocurrencies. This significantly mitigates the more general
problem of the number of false negative when considering the
detection of a Crypto-client at large: since FP are still due to
other cryptocurrencies, the detection algorithm could be still
considered successful (although not being able to fully identify
the Crypto-client).
A. Comparison with other solutions
To the best of our knowledge, our contribution is the
first one to leverage Machine Learning techniques to detect
Crypto-clients by analyzing the network traffic—though ML
techniques have been extensively used to effectively detect
anomalies in network traffic such as malware, intrusion de-
tection, etc.. In this paper we have proved that network
traffic generated by Crypto-clients is characterized by pattern
anomalies with respect to standard applications such as Skype,
YouTube, and standard software used during typical office
tasks.
Naive solutions [24] [25] [26] dealing with pure web-based
mining (cryptojacking) involve blacklisting, a set of malicious
URLs reported as suspicious from different sources, i.e., Twit-
ter, blogs, etc. The idea mainly resorts to the installation of a
plugin for the web-browser and by monitoring the connections,
preventing those belonging to the blacklist. Blacklisting is
neither effective nor efficient since it suffers from many
false negatives due to URL randomization and requires the
installation of third-party software in all the corporate devices.
Other solutions involve to monitor the CPU throttle and asking
for extra permissions to the web-browser when a process
requires high CPU usage [27]. While monitoring the CPU
is a promising solution, such a technique potentially suffers
from high false positive rates due to the impossibility of
discriminating between the miners and other CPU demanding
processes, such as videogames. Another interesting technique
has been recently proposed by [13]: authors combined multiple
techniques to eventually identifying cryptographic operations
and inferring on the execution of a miner.
We observe that while the above solutions can be adopted
for the detection of Miners under certain conditions, they do
not take into account Full Node detection. For this reason, the
solo mining activity, as well as other types of attacks described
in Section III-B, are not recognized by existing solutions.
Moreover, none of these solutions can be used to identify
the cryptocurrency used by the attacker. Finally, we highlight
that all the host-based solutions can be only adopted for the
detection of outsider adversaries delivering the crypto-jacking
attacks to the users browsing the web. Indeed, none of the
above solutions can be used for detecting insider adversaries,
i.e., malicious corporate employee willing to run the attack
from inside the Corporate Network by having full rights and
control of their devices, i.e., laptops, desktops, servers, etc..
Table VII wraps up on the comparison between our solution
and the existing ones from the literature.
B. Limitations.
In the following we list the major limitations of the proposed
solution, as well as the general limitations of the adopted
methodology.
Our Crypto-Aegis Framework, being rooted on ML
techniques, is significantly affected by the features’
identification and selection. Although we provided a detailed
analysis about the impact of features to the classification
algorithm performance, other features might improve the
figures reported in this paper.
The applications that could generate false positives (e.g.
Skype, Web Browsers, Email clients) considered in this study
and described in Section IV, are limited in number but we
believe they are quite representative of a typical scenario
(e.g. a corporate network) and as such, they represent a
good starting point to lay the foundations of crypto-mining
activities detection by only considering the encrypted network
traffic.
The length of the training dataset is another significant
parameter, and adopting longer traces is part of future work,
though our results are already good (an AUC of 0.99).
In our analysis, we provided an estimation of the time required
for detecting and identifying both the Full Node and the
Miner, i.e., about 12 seconds and 70 seconds, respectively,
but we are aware that those estimations are affected by several
TABLE VII
COMPARISON BETWEEN OUR SOLUTION AND THAT ONES ALREADY
PROPOSED IN THE LITERATURE.
Detection Identification AdversaryModel
Full
Node Miner
Full
Node Miner I
ns
ide
r
Ou
tsi
de
r
Blacklisting
[24] [25] [26] 7 3 7 7 7 3
CPU-throttle
monitoring
[27]
7 3 7 7 7 3
MineSweeper
[13] 7 3 7 7 7 3
Crypto-Aegis 3 3 3 3 3 3
parameters, i.e., the network configuration, the Crypto-clients,
the features, and possibly others.
Moreover, the geographical distribution of the nodes partic-
ipating to the consensus mechanism might represent another
significant factor for the detection and identification of the
Crypto-client.
Finally, all the ML-based techniques suffer from the evasion
attack, where a Crypto-client might reshape its (outgoing)
network traffic to decrease the detection and identification
performance of the classifier.
Note that all the above issues are clear directions for further
research.
XI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, in the context of unauthorized crypto-mining
activities, we have first proposed a novel attacker model
(sponge-attack) that subsumes the attacker model present
in the literature (cryptojacking). Then, we have introduced
Crypto-Aegis, a ML based framework that is able to detect and
identify crypto-mining activities related to the sponge-attack.
Crypto-Aegis enjoys several features; in particular: (i) it is
infrastructure independent; (ii) it is device independent; (iii)
it supports multi-adversarial profiles; (iv) it does not require
a clean state to operate; and, (v) it is highly effective (e.g.
F1-score of 0.96 and an AUC for the ROC greater than 0.99).
Moreover, we have also proved that the Crypto-Aegis frame-
work is resilient to the adoption (by the adversary) of VPN
tunnelling. The quality and viability of the achieved results,
superior to competing solutions in the literature, combined
with the novelty of the introduced attacker model, pave the
way for further research in this domain—a few issues being
exposed in Section X-B.
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